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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge. 
 
Shannon Sicher appeals from the District Court's denial 
of her motion to set aside a special condition of supervised 
release which prevents her from entering Lehigh and 
Northampton counties, in Pennsylvania, without per mission 
from her probation officer. Because that special condition is 
related to Sicher's history and characteristics, involves no 
greater deprivation of liberty than is necessary, and is not 
inconsistent with the pertinent policy statements issued by 
the Sentencing Commission, we will affirm the order of the 
District Court. 
 
We shall only review the factual and pr ocedural 
background of this case as necessary to pr ovide context for 
the discussion which follows. On May 5, 1995, Sicher pled 
guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and 
marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 846 and one count of 
aiding and abetting the distribution of marijuana near a 
school in violation of 21 U.S.C. S 860(a). On March 21, 
1996, she was sentenced to six years imprisonment 
followed by ten years supervised release. On July 22, 1998, 
the District Court granted Sicher's motion to modify her 
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 2255 and r esentenced her 
to time served and ten years of supervised r elease, subject 
to certain conditions. The two conditions relevant to this 
appeal were that she complete the first eight months of her 
supervised release in a community treatment center, and 
that she not enter the Allentown area, i.e.  Lehigh or 
Northampton counties, unless given permission to do so by 
her probation officer. Sicher did not object to either of these 
conditions when they were imposed. 
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When the District Court resentenced Sicher , it had before 
it substantial evidence concerning the conditions under 
which she was raised and her activities prior to 
incarceration. This evidence included the r eport of Kirk 
Heilbrun, Ph.D., a forensic psychologist; Sicher's allegations 
in support of her S 2255 motion; and the original 
presentence report. We will not r ecite this tragic history in 
every detail. It is sufficient to note that when Sicher was as 
young as nine years old, her family and friends began 
pushing her towards a life of prostitution, drug use, and 
other criminal activity. By the age of twelve, she was 
prostituting herself to support her mother and her mother's 
drug habit. She used many drugs herself, attempted suicide 
on several occasions, and was arrested numer ous times as 
a juvenile and as an adult. When, as a teenager , she made 
an attempt at reform, her associates quickly pulled her 
back to a life of crime. When she went to prison, however, 
she made strong progress towar d turning her life around by 
completing drug treatment and earning high grades in 
college classes. In her conversations with Heilbrun, Sicher 
admitted to experiencing significant anxiety whenever she 
was in the Allentown area, and she expr essed a desire to 
"get her kids and move away from Allentown." 
 
After spending approximately six months at a community 
treatment center in Philadelphia, Sicher violated the terms 
of her supervised release by associating with a felon and 
also by visiting one of her co-defendants in Allentown 
without permission from her probation officer. In January 
1999, she was expelled from the treatment center. At a 
hearing on February 12, 1999, the District Court r evoked 
the prior order of supervised release and sentenced her to 
twenty-four months imprisonment, to be followed by eight 
years of supervised release subject to the conditions 
previously imposed. Again, Sicher made no objection to the 
territorial limitation. She appealed, but that appeal was 
subsequently dismissed with her consent. 
 
On May 24, 2000, Sicher filed a pro se  motion to amend 
the conditions of supervised release, asking the District 
Court to remove the restriction that pr ohibited her entry 
into Lehigh and Northampton counties. She ar gued that the 
circumstances of her family's life had changed significantly 
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since the restriction was first imposed and she wished to 
return to her mother's home so that she could care for her 
mother and her two children. On June 1, 2000, the District 
Court denied the motion. It is from this denial that Sicher 
now appeals. 
 
This Court utilizes an abuse of discretion standard 
when reviewing the imposition of special conditions of 
supervised release. United States v. Loy , 191 F.3d 360, 369- 
70 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 1429 (2000). 
Because Sicher did not object to the imposition of the 
territorial limitation or the refusal to set that condition 
aside, however, the District Court's decision is reviewed for 
plain error. United States v. Par do, 25 F.3d 1187, 1193 (3d 
Cir. 1994). Under either standard, we discern no error. 
 
Imposition of supervised release is gover ned by 18 U.S.C. 
S 3583, which provides, in part, that: 
 
       "[t]he court may order, as a further condition of 
       supervised release, to the extent that such condition -- 
 
       (1) is reasonably related to the factors set forth in 
       section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); 
 
       (2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is 
       reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in 
       section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); and 
 
       (3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements 
       issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 
       28 U.S.C. 994(a); 
 
       any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of 
       probation in section 3563(b)(1) through (b)(10) and 
       b(12) through b(20), and any other condition it 
       considers to be appropriate. 
 
18 U.S.C. S 3583(d). The relevant sections of S 3553(a) 
provide that when a district court imposes a sentence, it 
must consider: 
 
       (1) the nature and circumstances of the of fense and the 
       history and characteristics of the defendant; 
 
       (2) the need for the sentence imposed -- 
 
       . . . . 
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       (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
       conduct; 
 
       (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the 
       defendant; and 
 
       (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational 
       or vocational training, medical care, or other 
       corrective treatment in the most ef fective manner[.] 
 
Sicher argues that the condition preventing her from 
entering Lehigh and Northampton counties is invalid for 
three reasons. First, she argues, it is not reasonably related 
to the nature and circumstances of her crime. Second, it 
involves a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably 
necessary. Third, it is inconsistent with the pertinent policy 
statements of the Sentencing Commission. 
 
With the reference to her first argument, Sicher seems to 
be suggesting that a condition of supervised r elease must 
relate to both the nature of the offense and the 
circumstances and history of the defendant. Section 
3553(a)(1), indeed, uses the word "and" in listing the factors 
that must be considered by a District Court in imposing 
sentence. While this Court has not spoken on the issue, 
other circuits have determined that despite the presence of 
the word "and," it is not necessary for all of the factors 
identified in S 3553(a) to be present before a special 
condition of supervised release may be imposed. See, e.g., 
United States v. Kent, 209 F.3d 1073, 1076 n.3 (8th Cir. 
2000) ("[t]he special condition imposed need not be related 
to each and every one of the factors"); United States v. 
Abrar, 58 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1995) ("a condition may be 
imposed if it is reasonably related to any one or more of the 
specified factors"); United States v. Johnson, 998 F.2d 696, 
698 (9th Cir. 1993) (the language of S 3553(a) offers "a list 
of factors to guide the district court's discr etion rather than 
a checklist of requisites, each of which must be found 
before any condition of supervised release may be 
prescribed"). No circuit has held otherwise. 
 
There was ample evidence that if Sicher wer e to return to 
the location and associates that shaped her youth, she 
would be extremely likely to retur n to a life of crime. Thus, 
the special condition disputed here is r elated to "the history 
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and characteristics of the defendant," and also serves to 
promote rehabilitation consistent withS 3553(a)(2)(D). The 
Eleventh Circuit has upheld a similar condition that had 
the same effect. See United States v. Cothran, 855 F.2d 749 
(11th Cir. 1988). In Cothran, the defendant's probation was 
subject to the condition that he remain outside Fulton 
County, Georgia, unless given permission to enter the 
county by his probation officer. Id. at 750. Atlanta is 
located in Fulton County, and the defendant was a popular 
and charismatic drug dealer in southeast Atlanta. Id. The 
Cothran court found that the condition was "r easonably 
related to the protection of the public" and was also 
"reasonably related to Cothran's r ehabilitation." Id. at 752. 
 
Sicher argues, next, that the special condition imposes a 
greater deprivation of liberty than is r easonably necessary, 
in violation of S 3583(d)(2). She asserts that the special 
condition effectively "banishes" her fr om the two counties 
comprising the Allentown area, denies her the ability to 
care for her mother, and forces her to either abandon her 
children or relocate them. She claims that banishment is 
generally considered to be illegal, pointing to several cases 
in which courts have struck down penalties of banishment. 
See United States v. Abushar, 761 F.2d 954 (3d Cir. 1985); 
McCreary v. State, 582 So.2d 425 (Miss. 1991); Johnson v. 
State, 672 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. App. 1984); State v. Young, 154 
N.W.2d 699 (Minn. 1967). These cases ar e easily 
distinguished from the case sub judice, however. Most of 
them involved unconditional banishment from the entire 
country, Abushar, 761 F.2d at 958, or from an entire state. 
McCreary, 582 So.2d at 427 (defendant r equired to leave 
state and only permitted to retur n twice a year to visit his 
children); Young, 154 N.W .2d at 382-83 (defendant required 
to "leave Minnesota and never come back her e"). Moreover, 
while in Johnson the defendant was r equired to "remain 
and reside outside" one particular county, id. 672 S.W.2d 
at 622, he "was not to return for any reason." Id. Further, 
the Johnson court specifically found that the territorial 
condition on defendant's probation did not"have any 
relationship to [defendant's] refor mation or rehabilitation." 
Id. at 623. It was also unrelated to the nature of his 
original offense, which was "unauthorized use of a vehicle." 
Id. at 622. Here, Sicher is prohibited from entering two 
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counties. That prohibition is not absolute, however, 
because she can enter either county with the per mission of 
her probation officer. Moreover , the territorial limitation is 
clearly intended to promote her rehabilitation by keeping 
her away from the influences that would most likely cause 
her to engage in further criminal activity. In sum, the 
special condition disputed here is not equivalent to the 
banishment that was rejected in Abushar and the various 
state cases. 
 
Certainly, the territorial limitation will have an impact on 
Sicher's family relationships. She will have to decide 
whether her children will live with her outside the two 
counties, or whether they will continue to live with her 
mother in Allentown. If the children live in Allentown, 
Sicher's access to them will be limited. It is simply not true, 
however, that she will never be able to visit them, or will be 
able to see them only if some other person brings them to 
her. Rather, she can visit them at any time, with the 
approval of her probation officer . Similarly, she will not be 
able to live with and take care of her mother in Allentown, 
but her mother may be able to live with her outside of the 
two counties.1 These minor impositions on her liberty are 
no greater than are necessary to pr omote her rehabilitation 
by keeping her away from negative, if not wholly disastrous, 
influences. 
 
Finally, Sicher argues that the special condition at issue 
here is inconsistent with the applicable policy statements of 
the Sentencing Commission. In particular, she points to the 
policy statements relative to U.S.S.G. S 5D1.3(d) and (e), 
which recommend a variety of special conditions that may 
be appropriate in certain circumstances. None of these 
special conditions includes a prohibition on entering a 
particular geographic area, and Sicher contends that the 
special condition imposed on her is thus inconsistent with 
the policy statements. There is no evidence, however, that 
these policy statements are intended to of fer an exhaustive 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This Court has no information as to whether Sicher's mother is a 
convicted felon, and expresses no opinion as to whether Sicher would 
violate the condition of her supervised release that forbids association 
with felons if she lived with her mother. 
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list of all possible special conditions. Courts have regularly 
approved of special conditions not explicitly contained on 
this list, so long as those conditions met the general 
requirements of S 3553. See, e.g., United States v. Amer, 
110 F.3d 873, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1997) (special condition 
requiring defendant to effect retur n of children from Egypt); 
United States v. Phaneuf, 91 F.3d 255, 263 (1st Cir. 1996) 
(special condition requiring defendant to get probation 
officer approval before accepting cr edit card or making any 
purchase over $100); United States v. Chinske, 978 F.2d 
557, 560 (9th Cir. 1992) (special condition r equiring 
defendant to submit to search of person, vehicle, and 
residence upon request). The fact that the special condition 
preventing her from entering two counties is not explicitly 
authorized by the policy statements simply does not cause 
the condition to be inconsistent with the policy statements. 
 
The decision of the District Court will be affir med. 
 
A True Copy: 
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